The Path of Compliance and the Path of Decentralization: Why Maker has no choice but to prepare to free float Dai

TL;DR:

Now with some clarifications to reduce misinformation potential

  • Financial regulation trends towards a post-9/11 paradigm of “either you’re with us or you’re against us” with eventual zero tolerance for anything that doesn’t give full control and surveillance powers to the state
  • The window of opportunity for DeFi to prove that it is worthy of a new middle ground of being considered a public, neutral financial utility rather than regulated as banks has now closed because DeFi failed to deliver anything of real value, and the massive crashes of Terra, Celsius etc ruined its mainstream image
  • Physical crackdown against crypto can occur with no advance notice, and with no possibility of recovery even for legitimate, innocent users. This violates two core assumption that we used to understand RWA risk, making the authoritarian threat a lot more serious.
  • Dai cannot become blacklistable, so Maker does not have the option of becoming compliant
  • The only choice is then to be prepared to limit attack surface through RWA exposure reduction, by having the option of enforcing a maximum relative exposure to RWA - triggering this would likely cause Dai to free float away from USD, at stable, predictable rate that feels like negative interest rates
  • The Endgame Plan offers two effective tools to deal with this: MetaDAOs and Protocol Owned Vault
  • MetaDAO token farming with Dai provides justification for why a free floating currency should exist and why users should accept something that falls in value vs USD
  • MetaDAO tokens can also incentivize more supply of Dai generated from decentralized collateral, allowing the system to scale better while remaining decentralized
  • Protocol Owned Vault (Maker accumulating a large amount of leveraged staked ETH) is another important tool as it allows Maker to earn income from negative Target Rate of Dai, and put a lower limit to how negative the Target Rate can go.

What’s the timeline for this:

Long form

This post is to outline the argument of why limited RWA exposure and free floating Dai is necessary, and the tools we can use to turn it from a risk into an opportunity.

Much of the information and opinion I’ m sharing here comes from conversations I’ve had with various well connected insiders following the TC sanctions, as well as knowledge that is publicly available and in some cases has been shared more privately over the past years.

The post 9/11 paradigm of financial regulation

First lets briefly discuss what I’ve heard many people refer to as the “post-9/11 paradigm”. Basically this is a financial regulatory trend that, when taken to its extreme, divides all financial activity into two boxes: Either you’re fully compliant, regulated bank, or you’re a terrorist.

Important to note that it’s a trend, not a black and white reality, meaning obviously there’s plenty of financial activity that isn’t fully regulated as a bank with total government control - but over time the trend is one way and financial freedom will get eroded, never increased as long as this trend remains.

Of course government control of finance is a historic trend that dates back literally the very first invention of paper currency in China (and how it eventually got controlled and hyperinflated), but 9/11 can be seen as the event that really created the modern momentum for this trend to reach a point where it is slowly but surely going to choke out all forms of financial freedom that it possibly can.

The fact that the mainstream views finance as an extremely shady industry run by evil and greedy wall street bros of course helps, because from that (pretty much true) perspective its easy to see why it makes sense to maximally regulate them into the ground.

The window of opportunity

The window of opportunity is an idea that me and many others held: The possibility that the immense potential benefits of blockchain technology and DeFi, when applied to the financial system through RWA integrations, could become the catalyst that finally changed the paradigm of financial regulation away from the post-9/11 paradigm and into a new post-blockchain paradigm. It’s easy to see how the advantages of transparency, credible neutrality, efficiency, inclusion etc. helps solve the problems that makes finance and wall street bros seem so bad in the first place.

Ideas like Clean Money and Financial Inclusion stemmed from this perspective, that if we played our cards right and used the last big crypto bull run to show real tangible benefits beyond what people would be expecting that truly showcase the massive positive potential of blockchain to the mainstream, such as mass financing of large scale renewable energy infrastructure that effectively did the governments job for it, or large scale access to cheap and efficient financial services for developing countries, etc.

At a certain point, if enough of things are done, and are combined with an aligned and effective media and PR campaign and united vision from our industry, the thinking is that it could be enough to finally show that there is a limit to when it makes sense to keep cracking down, increasing control and increasing bureaucy for financial activity because the upside in terms of public goods from permissionless financial innovation is impossible to ignore, and can overpower the politics of the old paradigm and introduce a new, third category that sits between fully regulated and fully decentralized: A Financial Public Good - blockchain enabled, neutral financial infrastructure that isn’t treated like a bank, but is treated like roads or Linux. Even if North Korea uses roads or Linux, we’re obviously not going to ban that because of the significant value it provides to all of society.

But unfortunately, as you can probably imagine, this window of opportunity has now closed for good. First of all, the blockchain industry completely and utterly failed to produce anything of value during the bull run. Basically nothing was achieved and no new products, services or anything with tangible benefit derived from blockchain technology has entered the mainstream consciousness at any level. Maker is a good example where we had a lot of initial support for Clean Money and a theoretical agreement with the concept - our intentions were in the right place. But nobody cares about intentions, and we were incapable of actually acting on that desire and turning words into action because, as it turns out, operating DAOs and doing useful working in decentralized paradigms is extremely hard.

Secondly and much worse than just the fact that crypto has still failed to show any kind of value to society are the human tragedies that the failures of the last crypto cycle produced that have now become synonymous with blockchain and crypto in the public consciousness. Essentially the moment Terra collapsed is really the moment we should have realized that there is simply no possibility that we will be able to persuade the public that crypto should be treated differently from other financial services. So not only has crypto produced nothing useful, but the mainstream awareness of crypto centers around disasters like Terra, Celsius and other crypto scams that have destroyed the savings of innocent, regular people that were lied to and in some cases even committed suicide as result. We unfortunately managed to create the mainstream image of the crypto bro as the one type of person that’s even worse than the wall street banker bro.

In hindsight, it is maybe also have been slightly naive to believe in the window of opportunity when you deconstruct it to what it really is: Thinking that we would stand a chance of re-engineering a meta as strong as 9/11… But no matter what, whether or not it was ever even possible, it is now over for good and we need to readjust our world views to get in line with reality.

The two core assumptions of RWA risk

The TC sanctions should not be seen as a direct consequence of any of these factors - rather it is most likely a random even that doesn’t really have anything to do with crypto directly, but rather was simply a quick and short term oriented attempt to produce a political win through some announcements and press releases. But it is a wakeup call to the consequences of not picking one of the two paths. Do you want to be treated as a bank, or do you want to be treated as something else than a bank and do you understand the full risk and consequences of that?

The risk of RWA was always considered justifiable, despite the fact that DAOs have no real legal presence or entity or ability to enforce legal rights (even if governments erroneously think so), because of two important factors.

The first factor was that any attempt to seize RWA or crack down on crypto’s weak points, such as blacklists or collateral freezes, would be telegraphed in advance in order to allow innocent and legitimate users time to respond. The thinking was that governments wouldn’t just nuke Maker and cause widespread harm to innocent people, they would simply ban Maker from relying on their legal systems if we don’t follow their regulatory regimes. That turned out to be wrong as in the TC sanctions case, it was kept secret right up until the trap was sprung, and innocent users (luckily a small amount) had their USDC frozen in the tornado cash smart contracts.

The second factor was the thinking that even if a freeze or seizure of RWA collateral happened, innocent users would have some path to recover their money, such as in the case of the e-gold Value Access Plan (VAP) e-gold - Wikipedia .

Unfortunately, that turns out not to be a given as seen with the TC sanctions, where right now it looks those affected by USDC blacklist may have effectively lost their money, and the ETH designated as risky may not have an easy path to legalize their assets, even if they are completely innocent and used TC for financial privacy completely legitimately.

This means the consequences of not being compliant and not becoming a bank are extremely severe. They’re not something you can just gamble with, especially not when it pertains to peoples savings.

Why Dai has no choice but to prepare to free float

So that leaves us with the two fundamental options: The path of compliance and eventually, on a long enough timeline, turning Maker into some kind of next-gen fintech product/neobank. Or the path of decentralization which means strictly limiting the degree to which regulatory crackdowns can damage the protocol.

But, there’s one important caveat: The path of compliance isn’t even available to us. Why? Dai was engineered that way, as the developers who created it had the foresight to build it in such a way that it could never possibly become a tool of financial surveillance and control, by completely locking out the possibility that a blacklist can be added or that it can be upgraded. Despite all our governance bureaucracy and troubles, Dai is actually a truly decentralized stablecoin in this sense.

There exists certain publicly discoverable facts, that when combined together with the fact that Dai cannot ever be blacklistable no matter how much Maker Governance would want to, makes it clear that there is a ticking clock counting down above our heads, and at some point in the future there is a high probability that Maker will be hit by a severe attack by global authorities targeting any attack surface they can find, through a process similar to what led to the TC sanctions.

One thing to clarify is that this is still very likely many years out - or at least we have to assume that’s the case because we simply do not have any realistic short term options that would enable to us to survive it. I’m also not claiming it is guaranteed, nothing ever is. No one can possibly predict something as complicated as this but if I had to I would “only” give it a 50/50 chance to happen at some point over the next decade. But if you know that there’s a 50% chance an airplane is going to crash, you are not going to board that airplane.

I’m obviously not going to spell out the facts I’m referring to above, but it’s fairly simple to put two and two together in light of recent events. I would encourage others to also not discuss it in public, there’s no reason to create that kind of unwanted and dangerous attention early on, even if its not yet likely to be a big risk.

As a result, we must choose the path of decentralization, as was always the intent and the purpose of Dai. And just like this was the original design of Dai, choosing the path of decentralization means preparing for the likely possibility that Dai will have to become free floating. The reason for this is simple: the path of decentralization means limiting our attack surface to physical threats, and specifically our RWA collateral as a percentage of the total portfolio. In the Endgame Plan I put this limit at 25% (before insurance and defensive measures are applied) during Eagle Stance, which is the strategy the protocol would employ while it is still not clear if there will actually be a crackdown or not.

The only way to guarantee a hard limit on RWA exposure is to allow Dai to free float, as excess demand for Dai may not be able to be met with additional supply backed by fully decentralized assets such as ETH. The only way to then deal with this imbalance and prevent the peg from breaking - which can break the entire system if the faith is lost that Maker Governance will take action to protect the peg - is to introduce a negative Target Rate, that would cause the price of Dai to free float away from 1 USD to a lower exchange rate, driving away Dai demand and increasing Dai supply as it becomes cheaper to generate with decentralized vaults such as ETH.

This can be a very hard reality to accept, but there is unfortunately no way around it. Dunning-Kruger attempts to guarantee a peg to 1 USD without having access to USD linked RWA collateral only ends in even worse misery and disaster, such as the Terra collapse. So our only choice is to prepare and do everything we possibly can to make it a transition that Maker can survive, and if we really play our cards right, it may end up becoming the opportunity Maker was waiting for all along.

2 powerful tools that can make free floating Dai a success

The main challenge with decentralization and free floating Dai is that nobody cares about it until its too late. And I mean LITERALLY nobody, even the people LARPing and running their mouth about decentralization aren’t using Rai. So the downside of decentralization, which is that it can lose value relative to the dollar, is extremely obvious and in your face, and most of the upside is completely hidden and cannot be understood by the human brain because of our inability to perceive long term and tail risk.

The Endgame Plan provides two very strong tools that can overcome this challenge and turn the free floating of Dai into something that Maker can survive, and even thrive with. The Endgame Plan was already designed around the idea of physical resilience and decentralized from the beginning, it was just treated as a more theoretical and abstract threat, so all that was really needed to change was to prioritize and accelerate the implementations of these measures.

MetaDAOs and MetaDAO tokens

The most important tool available are MetaDAOs. What’s the only way to get someone to accept a free floating price and decreasing rate that makes them lose value in dollar terms over time? You have to give them something else in return.

As it turns out, while decentralization has almost only downsides, there is one tangible upside that people actually care about. And it is not just any upside, it is the single most powerful thing that brought most people into the crypto space in the first place: The ability to create tokens. As also described in the Endgame Plan post, the creation of blockchain tokens is by far the most powerful form of meta engineering, and it is in fact so powerful that even governments recognize this power and try very hard to shut it down and control it.

With a decentralized currency, the creation of a decentralized economy run by decentralized businesses governed by tokens becomes possible, and it cannot be shut down or controlled by authorities regardless of how much they’d like to - as long as you have a real, actually decentralized currency underpinning it.

And you can provide this benefit to Dai holders right “in their face” by yield farming them MetaDAO tokens of projects that have real, profitable, sustainable and fully decentralized business models - but again that’s only possible because of the existence of a fully decentralized currency, which closes the loop and justifies the fact that Dai is free floating.

Beyond justifying the existence of Dai even if it is free floating, MetaDAO token yield farming can also be used to incentivize generation of decentralized Dai from fully decentralized collateral such as Staked ETH (Or, for maximum value preservation, EtherDai), which helps grow the supply of Dai and reduce the negative rates Dai holders have to accept.

Protocol Owned Vault

The other major tool is the Protocol Owned Vault - the strategy of having Maker itself accumulate large amounts of leveraged, Staked ETH and that way become a net issuer of fully decentralized, overcollateralized Dai. This has two big advantages: First of all it allows Maker to take advantage of the negative rates created from natural Dai demand, that will actually get exacerbated by the existence of MetaDAO yield farming (which nevertheless has to exist because it provides the fundamental core justification for why Dai even makes any sense at all if it’s not pegged to the dollar).

It should be easy to see how it can be very lucrative to both have a significant leveraged exposure to an asset that earns a yield of 5+% per year, and then on top of that have large amounts of debt that itself could yield e.g. 5% per year due the negative rates making it automatically go down over time in dollar terms.

Secondly and much more importantly, having a protocol owned vault allows Maker to more directly control and impact how negative the rates are allowed to get, helping stabilize the free floating Dai and protect users against the uncertainty of randomly getting hit by extremely negative rate because of some demand or supply shock. Basically, if the rates get low enough Maker can step and in allow the Protocol Owned Vault to take on very high leverage in order to first of all stabilize the rates so they don’t go any lower, but then also just harvest the massive potential for yield that debt with very negative rates have.

Cypherpunk meta

A last major benefit of decentralized and free floating Dai is that it allows Maker to finally return to its true roots. Not just the roots of Maker and Dai, but of crypto itself, which ultimately comes from the Cypherpunk movement all the way back from the early 90’s when governments first tried to ban encryption and enforce a hellish dystopian future where the concept of any kind of personal privacy itself becomes illegal (much like financial privacy has already become).

It’s hard to overstate how many of Maker’s cultural, community and governance problems ultimately stems from the perceived deviation of this original ethos, and the contradiction that many of the necessary actions taken over time, such as the regulatory strategy of the Maker Foundation (which required very tight information control), or the introduction of unlimited USDC in order to enforce the USD peg at all costs. In the end I don’t believe those choices were wrong at the time, as it allowed us to get to where we are today and have real network effects, momentum and success. But we should not underestimate the cost it had on the community and the soul of the project - and now we have the chance to get all of that back again.

I think this is actually the factor that may end up being the biggest wildcard of all. If we can recapture that original spirit and once again prove to be the vanguard of the entire crypto spirit as we once where when we pioneered actually functional on-chain stablecoins and created DeFi, it will create a completely new level of attention and positive meta around the Maker ecosystem as a whole, which will result in an influx of users, community members, contributors - but also increase spark in Maker Governance, reducing bureaucracy, stalling and extractive intentions.

Maker will not just become exciting once again, it will be the single most exciting and important place to be in all of crypto - and we have the perfect tool that allow us to capture that meta and hook people into our ecosystem: MetaDAO yield farming.

Collapse meta

Another last point that is important to discuss is how this all fits into the broader, global meta caused by the state of irreversible, accelerating decline that exists in modern globalized society. There are multiple factors, including overshoot, overpopulation, climate change, peak oil, peak farmland, peak fertilizer, post-truth social media etc. It is likely that modern global capitalism cannot overcome these problems of its making, and the most immediate consequence is that politics will become increasingly polarized and unhinged. The world is going to enter a new, much more chaotic and unpredictable equilibrium dominated by anarchy, ecofascism, deglobalization and large scale human suffering.

This matters for Maker and Dai for two reasons.

The first reason is that broken states and limping zombie economies, or states obsessed with capital controls and general authoritarianism, tend to be more likely to crack down on crypto. It’s easy to see the trend if you look at the list of countries that have already banned crypto: Bitcoin ban: These are the countries where crypto is restricted or illegal | Euronews

This means that as the global economy and socioeconomic stability increasingly falls apart across most places in the world, the likelihood of a physical attack by state actors against Maker goes up. As this trend is accelerating and irreversible, this by itself adds another strong argument on the pile of why Maker has to prepare to go fully decentralized and expect the worst against it’s RWA collateral, requiring it to become free floating.

The second reason is that such a chaotic and dystopian future is exactly the reason why Dai and crypto as a whole exists. People will need tools to navigate the future when government and the elite can no longer be trusted to even keep themselves from collapsing, let alone keep the best interests of the people in mind. The most important and powerful tool in such a situation is going to be collapse-resilient, decentralized money.

As all other currencies pour fuel on the fire of the global financial ponzi scheme that is already deeply in overshoot, we can prepare for the worst and focus on accumulating resilient collateral such as ETH, or even eventually physically resilient RWA (as described in the Endgame Plan post) and build something that could end up meaning the difference life and death for millions.

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TL&DR summary :sweat_smile:

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Nice. Will update to also include a TLDR in the front

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Well done! Glad I saw this before I started to read :joy:

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Awesome post. Made a twitter thread summarizing the whole thing!

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If this is true, I disagree that free floating DAI will be of much help. Why would an authoritarian government disallow fiat pegged stable assets, but permit free floating stable assets (or even volatile base crypto assets for that matter) when they still undermine government control over the monetary system?

Sure, removing directly censorable collateral (which effectively requires free floating peg) could help improve resilience. But there are many other points of failure that are essentially irreducible at least in the medium term - oracles, on-off ramps, consensus nodes of underlying chain, some amount of workforce and/or voter participation, etc.

I think this window of opportunity is definitely getting smaller, but is not a foregone conclusion. What are some reasons that Maker / DAI ecosystem, and wider crypto space still have reason for optimism?

  • China is giving the world a preview of CBDC; this is good in a way, because it shows the rest of the world the predictable outcome of directly state controlled money (statist surveillance dystopia)
  • Recent Canada trucker incident of debanking political opponents / protesters was a big wake up call, particularly because Trudeau had been viewed as a very liberal figure; this episode undermined the argument that government financial control is only problematic in authoritarian states, not democracies
  • CBDC are unlikely to be adopted/mandated in the US and other pro-market states regardless, because it conflicts with vested interests in the financial sector and would remove free market forces from credit creation
  • US govt needs new sources of reserve demand, and global retail usage of USD instruments (stablecoins) is by far the most viable option with the least negative impact to the domestic economy (compare with requiring banks to hold greater amount of treasuries or central bank reserves, which would starve the private sector of credit)
  • The economic benefits of faster/real-time electronic payments are huge, but they can only be really achieved using instruments with settlement assurance (otherwise the payments are not real time, because the recipient needs to wait to avoid chargebacks, exactly like current T+2 systems)
  • Real time payments cannot be safely implemented with centralized assets; consider what would happen if Circle had their admin keys compromised and used to mint unlimited USDC without authorization; only decentralized assets can provide provable security

So what exactly should we be doing? I think making preparations to free float DAI is sensible, but we shouldn’t try to convince ourselves this solves the problem. I think a more balanced approach of reducing liquidity risk from centralized assets (eg LP token backing displacing PSMs), strong public engagement and advocacy for decentralized money, and willingness to sacrifice short term profit/burn/number-go-up to try to win greater ETH market share and decentralized collateral backing will be more effective.

Introducing metaDAOs is not a cure all. DAO to DAO relationships imo are more complicated and difficult to manage than service provider - client relationships, not less. This is particularly true due to possibility of overlapping ownership of MKR and metaDAO tokens. Being able to issue tokens is powerful, but only works in the long term if the underlying protocol makes sense as a spin off, and has sufficient autonomy from Maker to be able to deliver value to metaDAO token holders. We can’t depend on retail investors lighting their money on fire buying valueless governance tokens indefinitely.

Protocol owned vault is also compelling idea, but we should look at FEI’s experience. tldr is that DAOs are not well suited to directional trading activity.

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I agree with basically all of these points, but I also think they support the plan as it’s currently designed. Will go through each important point to discuss:

If this is true, I disagree that free floating DAI will be of much help. Why would an authoritarian government disallow fiat pegged stable assets, but permit free floating stable assets (or even volatile base crypto assets for that matter) when they still undermine government control over the monetary system?

Fully agree with this. I do think pegged assets will be hit harder and earlier, but that still doesn’t mean we shouldn’t expect to get hit in all cases, so the reason for free floating is to enable us to have negative rates to reduce demand and increase supply from decentralized collateral.

Sure, removing directly censorable collateral (which effectively requires free floating peg) could help improve resilience. But there are many other points of failure that are essentially irreducible at least in the medium term - oracles, on-off ramps, consensus nodes of underlying chain, some amount of workforce and/or voter participation, etc.

Exactly, we have to go all the way with physical resilience and decentralization. There is no middle ground and that means solving all of these problems.

Oracles are actually somewhat easier to decentralize since we can use elixir and meta elixir to provide accurate prices for eth, mkr and metadao tokens in dai - and well curated on-chain sources controlled and collateralized by the MetaDAOs for dai price in usd. The MetaDAOs can also take responsibility and collateralize the operation of actual physical oracle nodes, as well as staking nodes when we develop that in the longer term

On/off ramps is just a matter of going through ETH, and in general we should only rely on the existance of an already on-chain economy. Having friendly jurisdictions that allow open use and conversion of dai is of course a big plus.

Security of the underlying chain is difficult, but the best we can do is to influence lido and eventually have the metadaos build out their own secure node networks.

And for the workforce… at this point there is no way around it - it will have be fully anonymous. It’s a hard problem but from the maker perspective it is actually not even an issue because maker already doesn’t have to interact with people, just with metadaos. So the metadaos will have to figure out the challenge of bootstrapping decentralized reputation, as well as develop extremely strong frameworks that means someone sybil attacking would literally have to do the work of 2 people, which then isn’t really a problem.

None of these things can realistically be in place in the short run, but I think it can be achieved within 3 years, or at least be close to done.

I think this window of opportunity is definitely getting smaller, but is not a foregone conclusion. What are some reasons that Maker / DAI ecosystem, and wider crypto space still have reason for optimism?

I also agree that it’s not guaranteed, but the probability is now high enough, and the consequences severe enough, that we have to act as if its certain. Basically the 10% chance of the plane crashing means you don’t take the plane analogy. The Endgame Plan leaves open the possibility that if 3 years from now it turns out that everything is just absolutely peaceful and all of the trends stopped, then we could choose to delay the free floating further. But because we need to have the option to do it at year 3 without causing a meltdown, we have to prepare as if it is happening for certain. Personally I am more pessimistic than optimistic, but of course we need to look at the actual facts and circumstances at the time - the important thing is we prepare.

I think making preparations to free float DAI is sensible, but we shouldn’t try to convince ourselves this solves the problem.

Well I disagree with this. If we really go fully decentralized, as in full phoenix stance with no attack surface including only decentralized/resilient collateral, anonymous workforce, decentralized oracles, decentralized downloadable frontends/toolkits, broad incentivized and active voter base with strong privacy tools (built into the decentralized frontends), then this does actually solve the problem. There is no way to kill or seriously wound such a system.

I think a more balanced approach of reducing liquidity risk from centralized assets (eg LP token backing displacing PSMs), strong public engagement and advocacy for decentralized money, and willingness to sacrifice short term profit/burn/number-go-up to try to win greater ETH market share and decentralized collateral backing will be more effective.

I completely agree with this and this is basically the idea for Pigeon Stance and Eagle Stance. We shouldn’t give up on Clean Money and other attempts to showcase the value of DeFi and blockchain to society. But we also shouldn’t sleepwalk like pigs to the slaughter, and make sure that we balance our exposure with the risk as it gets worse over time.

Introducing metaDAOs is not a cure all. DAO to DAO relationships imo are more complicated and difficult to manage than service provider - client relationships, not less. This is particularly true due to possibility of overlapping ownership of MKR and metaDAO tokens. Being able to issue tokens is powerful, but only works in the long term if the underlying protocol makes sense as a spin off, and has sufficient autonomy from Maker to be able to deliver value to metaDAO token holders. We can’t depend on retail investors lighting their money on fire buying valueless governance tokens indefinitely.

Agree. Fundamentally the MetaDAOs are designed for positive sum activity, the core being attracting users to stake and leverage ETH with the Maker Protocol, and use Dai for savings and payments. So at their core MetaDAOs create value by developing good meta and using it to attract users for Maker, as basically gamified marketing and distribution teams. If they can then also develop other innovation and value add that’s just additional free value that benefits everyone.

One thing that makes the DAO2DAO relationships with MetaDAOs a lot simpler is the fact that they are always heavily collateralized, and maker can simply take the collateral from them if internal maker processes determine that they’ve failed to deliver a commitment and the voters agree.

Protocol owned vault is also compelling idea, but we should look at FEI’s experience. tldr is that DAOs are not well suited to directional trading activity.

Also agree, I think we need a simple strategy of using all income to go 2x leveraged long at a slow and steady pace, and then stop buying if ETH rises in a way that looks similar to past bubbles - unless the negative rates are too severe and the yield makes the risk worth it or it is critical for not destroying confidence in Dai.

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I eco @monet-supply here, and I don’t want to repeat several points that he has so eloquently made already.

On Relationship with Sovereign Regulators

Is the current relationship between global regulators and large DeFi protocols sustainable? No, it isn’t. I would not extrapolate the TC episode, which is punctual and probably even (don’t kill me) motivated by good intentions - although with clumsy action, but the relationship between credit or pseudo-currency DeFi protocols is not set in stone yet. I personally dislike using catchy sentences that polarise opinions (9/11, terrorism, etc.) but this is my personal taste and I have never been a good politician.

Is there a way to shield entirely from dealing with regulators? No, there is not. As long as we interact in the real world as humans, we have relationships with other sovereign banking actors, we will always have to deal with regulators of other economies. Sovereign countries have often control of their borders and financial system, yet they need to compromise with large economies because in the nature of things they are interrelated. Look at Switzerland and their relationships with the DoJ. Obviously if we want to illude ourselves we can, but it won’t get us far.

Is there a way to limit existential risk coming from regulators? Yes, there is. Limiting and selecting carefully the links with the real world is a start - including reducing our counterparty exposure to the USA and Circle, as @rune suggested, but definitely not a panacea. I’d adventure myself in saying that a pro-active approach with regulators would lead us further than a ideological one, but we are in the realm of opinions. I have the belief that good faith and good practice can go a long way, like for example showing regulators that we have the right internal checks and balances to take creditworthiness decisions - currently it’s just a jungle where corruption, as per Rune’s own voice, should be incentivised because it’s a good vector for improvement. I would also adventure myself in saying that a larger surplus buffer could be another good step towards improving relationships with the regulator. I have not been in the insiders’ room here, but I have dealt with regulators (including and mainly the ECB and other European national supervision agencies) a lot in the past and I am afraid to say that most of their concerns have solid ground. If you disagree, I am asking if you have been around the financial system during the 2008-2012 era.

On Endgame and MetaDAOs

I share the view that Maker core should be simplified, and I myself have been a strong proponent of DAO-to-DAO relationships à la D3M. But as @monet-supply said DAO-to-DAO relationships are difficult. Ultimately, GIGO rules: if there is not the incentive for MetaDAOs to do a fine job by onboarding and monitoring good collateral, the destructive effect cannot be compensated by token farming, or by the hope that retail investors will just digest whatever we drop to them. Hint: farming tokens to raise money from retail investors are not a good way to improve relationships with the regulators. And here again, I agree with the regulator.

On the peg, I see that there is a lot of discussion on how to absorb excess demand. Although the PSM has been a way better framework that the buy-and-burn-Luna model advocated by Terra, that made so many $LUNA holders reach, especially the ones who opted out on time, I agree with everyone that it is suboptimal, it is not accretive, and it is making $DAI a $USDC wrapper of negligible importance. Does it have to be improved? I think so. Downward pressure, however, is more difficult to manage. Maker is ultimately a thinly capitalised bank, with very limited surplus buffer, and expanding its complexity without a parallel increase of the cushion is dangerous to say the least. We have experienced the success of the over-collateralised model to manage token market risk, we should adopt the same to manage credit and operations risk as well.

I also agree that preparing for a float of $DAI is wise. No currency has successfully expanded by maintaining a peg in infinity. I agree that a floating band is way more useful, and I am myself a fan of $RAI’s automated open market operations. How we get there, however, it’s a different conversation.

Maker won’t be here for a long time unless we grow up and:

  1. Improve internal checks and balances
  2. Seek proactive conversations with regulators
  3. Improve drastically our governance model
  4. Minimise complexity
  5. Ensure a significant capital cushion

The alternative is RAI+, a permissionless lower-vol derivative product on $ETH. Great, useful, but nothing more than a permissionless financial product.

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I completely agree with you, although the TC thing more than surprise, it was a future that was in voices, we remember that TC had been a money laundering niche for the pyramid scams of the P2E of 2021, in addition to other movements of schemes ponzis like Generación Zoe from Argentina, knowing the multiple collapse that occurred in cryptocurrencies and that the government was not going to be able to have its % tax, probably found out the niche, they could even say that they did not attack Monero because it is almost impossible, the thing is that they did not it can be “verifiable” that innocent people have been used TC and casually blocked more than that they say “I’m innocent because I posted it on Twitter”

Since we knew that members of the cypherpunks were being hunted down one by one in the 90s, we had to understand that this would not be easy, but particularly if there is no real partnership between crypto and material, how could we enter the global market? biggest in the world?

In order to achieve this we must first undo or lower the exposure of USDC, we cannot dictate “we are a decentralized entity” when we are the largest holders of USDC, the mentality must change if we want full decentralization, make the contracts for RWA tiny, not look for large companies (even if something bad happens the impact is not so serious) and we cannot dictate decentralization when we are happy with associations like BlackRock, we must follow the legacy of privacy and freedom, or at least camouflage centralization with decentralization

Totally agree, but the adventures of End Game are very abrupt, difficult to understand for new users, if we want to be what it was before we need support, the decentralization mentality has to be totally real, and always meticulous with the plays and the cards that are used, because it is useless, to dictate and not follow the example, RWA and End Game can coexist RWA as you say, to a lesser extent, of course, but the greatest operation that will exist in cryptography is the union between the real world and crypto, we must find to be that bridge that a person will want to have without KYC and without any kind of danger.

To conclude, the future is imminent, from Powell seriously thinking about applying CBDC to the European Union, the average user will have to get used to electronic money compulsorily, just as he got used to wearing a mask without putting up any opposition, when the population gets used to using CBDC and fully entering virtual money will make capital income much easier, they will have to know cryptocurrencies, and Maker and DAI will be there to receive them, more than 8 years ago the total capitalization did not exceed one billion, now they have that capacity Doge, so we should not despair because the opportunities are there, as our previous generation got used to debit/credit cards and points of sale and bank transfers, later our generation will get used to P2P transactions.

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Yea, not sure how the TC episode had good intentions. Maybe I’m misunderstanding you.

I’m also a bit confused by your opinion here. I believe you’re formulating a misconception that “farming tokens” in the EndGame State is for raising money (perhaps a revisit of the EndGame Plan v3 is necessary for clarification), and on the other hand you point out the limited Surplus Buffer (we can All agree needs improvement) which has proponents who are vocal in resolving such by raising money via traditional Investment Banking rails. How is the latter option better?

IMO, adding and capturing a large majority of outstanding stETH can improve the SB positively. My point is, shouldn’t the Growth plan for MakerDAO focus on attracting more collateral (stETH), innovate via ETHD, limiting RWAs to a certain percentage, while improve internal check and balances with MetaDAOs, and allowing the core of the DAO to be resilient in a “stance” that combines balance, defense, and readiness?

Thanks Frank,

As usual, I will stick to Occam’s razor.

The good intention is that of limiting a tool that has immense potential to launder money, and track record of being used a lot to do so. The secondary effects on those who have used the protocol in good faith, or on the narrative of freedom of programming and freedom of speech, have been the clumsiness I talk about.

Again, let’s stay away from jargon-ing stuff. What does investment banking rail mean? I am not advocating for a rail, I am advocating for an asset. And that asset is cash. There is a strong reason very sophisticated regulators have been continuously pushed towards simplification in tiering capital reaching the point that if it’s cash is good, if it’s not cash, it should be heavily discounted because its correlation with other assets in moments of crisis is all TBC. I do not care how you put the cash in the Surplus Buffer, as long as we do. But others might care.

I personally have a bias towards discussing merits of an investment with a pro rather than trying to meme a retail investor, but I might be too old.

Agree with you entirely, but don’t spill “with MetaDAOs” as a necessary step, it is a tool that has been proposed, and just a tool. Personally, I am not against it, but I would like to see it tested in a very simple use case, debated, VOTED (bold, big letters), and deployed. And then continue with building up the complexity.

Back where I started: Occam’s razor. It is a fair assessment that a complex construct hides several attack vectors and existential risk angles. I would truly appreciate less writing and more engineering starting from a very simple building block. I have indeed read Endgame v3, but its complexity makes it impossible for a researcher like myself to offer a holistic view of its implications and risks.

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Well, since DAO’s are fairly new and comparable to a 6-month baby that needs a lot of Doctor visits–perhaps the best approach is Hiccum’s Dictum at a measure rate. I recommend you dissect the Endgame in pieces. Start with the proposed 2.5 years of the Pigeon Stance. Break it down without the jargon and publish it on Dirt Roads. Your downside, you come to conclusion that the Endgame proposal is the best path forward. Your upside, you get me and others to read your newsletter. :wink:

What do you have to lose.

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I think your perspective of financial regulation tends to miss the forest for the trees. The trend since 9/11 for increased surveillance and control is objectively true, but there is nothing but speculation in how this trends pertains to the future. The very existence of cryptoassets and their persistent could serve as an indicator that this trend is already being tested in the other direction.

I would argue that overreach of government enforcement is an aberration away from the norm, and it’s just as likely to see a swing in the opposite direction, rather than an ultimate continuation upwards. Democratic countries are slow in the development of policy, and despite years of warnings from folks like Marx and Mao, they have been far more successful in supporting the normative principles of liberalism than not. Why should that fundamentally change in the 21st century? Information technology has been as much of an enabling factor for democratic trends as it has been an enabling factor for government authoritarianism.

Francis Fukuyama went far enough to call liberal democracy the “End of History”, and that “the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” As bad as things get, to bet the massive civil societies of North America and Western Europe will abandon this trend is an extreme viewpoint.

I think the Endgame plan does a lot to strike the right balance between my rather optimistic perspective here and the pessimistic one you paint, but I think in the end it still fails to provide the regulatory protection you are looking for. @luca and @monetsupply cover this pretty well, but I’ll add emphasis to the benefit and need for a positive narrative and a proactive stance with regulated society. The meta of Dai and Maker around these two points has often been a much stronger tool in affecting outcomes here than not. And I don’t think that window has closed, especially as the Tornado Cash sanctions are to be challenged in court and it’s far from clear how larger global society will continue to react to the outcomes of the recent weaponization of the dollar.

In the end, there’s a lot in the endgame I agree with: the organizational restructuring of the MetaDAOs seem incredibly useful, balancing RWA allocation against the larger balance sheet is critical, the leveraged long on Eth seems like a good strategy for Maker, and developing inherent resilience makes a lot of sense (and is truly a hallmark of any digital, critical-services system).

However, I find this perspective of regulation, politics, and society incredibly flawed.

In the narrative you’re describing here, you seem to paint a picture of the real-world as a place that isn’t worth fighting for and that Dai shouldn’t be fighting for. I think that this is abandoning the vision you’ve previously painted for this project and is certainly giving up on the biggest tool Dai has had so far - a positive narrative of a more productive, more equitable, and more efficient finacial system.

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Tornado Cash had extremely little exposure to RWA and is highly decentralized, but that didn’t stop it from being sanctioned. I don’t see how free floating Dai would prevent Maker from experiencing the same fate. The Treasury is not going to care about our RWA exposure when issuing sanctions.

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It’s so good to finally see this recognized by weighty MKR voting power. I’ve been in the minority warning about this exact risk for years. It has seemed that it’s been mostly the Americans that have been sympathetic to this viewpoint, I assume due to our proximity and experience with the primary state actor we’re referring to. I would like to propose some concrete immediate steps to begin walking back from the cliff edge we’ve found ourselves on, if that is possible.

  • First: gradually begin raising the tin on the PSM to immediately begin reducing USDC demand by the system. There is a non-linear demand curve that increases exponentially as the PSM fees approach zero. After reducing the tin to zero the system began rapidly taking on USDC to embarassing and self-destructive levels, as was predictable and predicted. In an ideal situation, the tin value could be lerped up to some percentage where the protocol itself is no longer the exchange of first resort, instead letting the market discover a value somewhere in between. The PSM should ultimately be removed from the system or left set at a value near the collateral liquidation penalty fee. Letting Dai float above peg is not critical to the system at all, and it encourages traditional collateral vault usage by allowing users to get more value for their Dai at market than it’s nominal system value. We’ve been neglecting vault holder needs for years and forgoing the sustainable growth and income that they provide.

  • Second: Decrease the collateralization ratio of all ETH-X ilk types. These are the premier cryptoassets in our ecosystem due to their innate value, market liquidity, and lack of regulatory attack surface. Lowering the collateralization ratio allows more Dai per vault to be issued by the system and helps increase supply sustainably. There are risks to the system in lowering this ratio, but our Liquidations 2.0 module has been working well for over a year and I’m convinced that we can handle it. We also need to evaluate this risk in the context of the risks posed by USDC and RWA’s. A lower collateralization ratio furthermore sets a hard cap on the price of Dai. If we assume no PSM and a collateralization ratio of 15% on ETH-A, at $1.15 Dai it becomes cost-effective for users to buy ETH, generate Dai to market sell the arb, and walk away from their vaults. The protocol can liquidate the collateral later and collect the penalty fee from the sale of the assets. This puts a guaranteed hard upward cap on the Dai price by directly incentivizing vault usage. It may be gauche to say it, but the protocol has actually profited most in the past year from market downturns due to the liquidation penalties than from standard stability fees anyways, so we should not be afraid to let these mechanisms work.

  • Medium-Long term: Aggressively work toward automating the core protocol with the goal of ultimately locking out governance actions from core components. I am speaking as an individual here, but as a member of the Protocol Engineering team I can tell you that my time since Black Thursday has been primarily focused on securing the “aggressive growth” modules that have mostly resulted in destabilizing the system and which have created additional fires for the DAO and PE to put out. I’ve developed an on-chain dss rate calculator that can be used for rate automation relative to debt ceiling usage, and which could ultimately result in a module that allows governance to set an implausibly high debt ceiling for an ETH vault, with rates automatically managed by the algorithm. That would allow the system to continue operating in the event that governance is unable or unwilling to modify the system. The rate expansion and contraction function in that module is a bit of a trick that needs to be solved for, and unfortunately one we haven’t had time to focus on.

I want to make it clear to everyone that the incentive mechanisms within Dai work as designed, as Rai has been proving, although they may not operate quickly enough for many in the community. It should be noted that Sai traded below peg for the entirety of it’s lifecycle, and Dai traded below peg prior to Black Thursday. It is it’s natural state. It was only after Black Thursday and due to the mechanical and incentivized Dai demand from Curve and Compound that Dai broke peg high. Even then, the price trended down for months prior to the imposition of the PSM and likely would have continued to do so if permitted, all while encouraging safe Dai generation from user vaults.

Anyways, I’m very glad that there’s recognition that some form of ossification of the protocol is necessary in this environment, and that a soft peg is a worthwhile price to pay for warding off the existential risks of working with hostile jurisdictions. That’s the project I invested in personally and professionally. I’m here for this.

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The great detail is that as long as you have USDC, BUSD and USDT you are potentially exposed to being frozen since they are centralized, and the “decentralized” ones do not escape either since practically we are the best of decentralization but if Circle freezes or sanctions Maker and DAI they will obviously look bad and could be removed

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+1 to this, and to the good points already made by @monet-supply and @luca_pro.

The extrapolation of the TC crackdown to Maker’s very different set of facts has gone too far (in general, not specific to this post). We simply do not know what the future holds in terms of how regulators will approach Maker and DeFi, and I think it’s important to reject a deterministic (and deeply pessimistic) narrative of impending regulatory crackdowns as part of a “one way trend” towards the erosion of financial freedom. History doesn’t support that argument - as @Khan points out, liberalism is a powerful force.

Having contingency plans is no bad thing, but we should not develop Maker’s future state around a needlessly negative model of the real world. Let’s not yet give up on the prospect of building, as Rune put it:

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Some background context for those that don’t know me so you know where I’m coming from because this might be contentious.

I co-founded Bidali - a reg compliant multi-chain crypto payments solution working on enabling cryptocurrency for more p2p real world commerce. Been in crypto since 2015 because of its potential to enable p2p open commerce, improve financial access & autonomy, and lift people out of poverty. I have seen first hand how corruption and inadequate financial access can cause harm. I’ve also seen and assisted with financial crime investigations. I believe cryptocurrency can be a better alternative than our current solution and FinTech trends, and I’ve been obsessed with how cryptocurrency becomes real money. This is what initially attracted me to DAI in 2017. I was around before and during the DAI Black Thursday that ultimately led to the USDC collateral decision (which I voted against). I co-chair the Canadian Blockchain Consortium and since speaking in Davos in 2020, I often speak with many politicians, central bankers and regulators as part of my CEOing and advocacy work.

(Hey @rune :wave:. Long time since we chatted over beers in my buddy’s Davos brewery)


As someone who’s been involved with regulators and governments in many jurisdictions with regards to crypto assets, DeFi, etc. I completely agree with Luca, @monet-supply, and Asad’s comments.

I wanted to share some of my thoughts I’ve had bottled for some time.

How Does a Cryptocurrency Become Money?

A path to any cryptocurrency becoming used as money is only viable if you can use it to efficiently and cost effectively pay for goods, services and scarce resources across space and time.

The currency that satisfies this will emerge as the winner, resulting in the broadest use, and consequently, the most demand among users. This is the crux of achieving “decentralized money”. The most important factor in achieving sufficient decentralization is the distribution of the money and the non-correlated demand and usage of it, not the issuance mechanism or the protocol itself. Of course, how centralized the issuance and the ability to censor transactions at the protocol level is also important, especially in the digital era, but if a protocol on a decentralized network is immutable, it matters not whether one person created and thew away the key or thousands.

What matters more to the stability and demand of a strong currency is the broad distributed demand and usage of it. If we look at USD for example, it is widely held and widely used for global trade. This prevents any one party from accumulating enough that they can cause a run because there is large demand. Furthermore, there is a requirement to pay taxes in it (which also drives demand). While USD is minted from the Fed it is actually very censorship resistant, especially in cash form. This has everything to do with its distributed and uncorrelated usage. It’s why someone can use it to buy groceries in the US via credit card, someone can forge USD bills in Peru and use them as currency, and why, even though USD is illegal in Venezuela and there are political sanctions, it is now the dominant currency there.

I see this broad currency demand as very difficult to achieve for cryptocurrency (or any digital form of money) without complying with regulation today because, as we’ve seen with TC, even if the underlying technology renders censorship impossible at the protocol level, because the money can be tainted near instant (as opposed to cash), the societal risks of interacting with a tainted currency breaks the social consensus required for it to satisfy it’s ability to be good money. Money are just IOUs that represent credit or hard assets after all…

Sure, some people in some parts of the world, may be comfortable with this taint risk. For some this will be because they are anon, are in a favourable country, or they are already undertaking criminal activity where their counterparties don’t care about the taints either. But to ultimately reach a large enough mainstream adoption such that a currency would be sufficiently decentralized and “too big to fail” would be impossible if there is significant risk of confiscation or persecution with a tainted currency.

Ultimately, regardless of the technology used to make it more efficient and secure, money is a social consensus tool. If users are worried about it retaining its value or its ability to be used to pay for goods and services, the consensus surrounding its value will erode.

Why Hasn’t This Worked So Far?

The lack of “real world” demand and utility is something that every cryptocurrency so far has failed to solve and has seemed to neglect. Largely they are not used to pay for real goods and services because they haven’t garnered enough trust and utility, especially compared to the status quo. For large scale usage, this includes regulatory compliance.

Today, at some point in the payment chain there is friction that prevents a stablecoin from being used to pay for real world goods and services better than the status quo because they need to be converted back to traditional financial infrastructure (which already has compliance challenges). Until you can pay for your food, rent, utilities and taxes with DAI, this will prevent people from accepting it for payment in a large scale.

This could happen by using an intermediary (which is what we do at Bidali) but I would argue you need to be able to directly pay for all these things without using an intermediary to really realize the benefits and become properly decentralized. To pay taxes would most definitely require regulatory compliant and government buy-in, where they themselves could be but one user in a decentralized system. Not every government truly controls their own currency, nor do they necessarily want to.

In any case, presently converting from DAI to a better medium of exchange to pay for these things happens through a centralized entity that is even more likely to be a target for regulatory compliance. As a result, that on/off ramp has to charge more fees to offset this cost.

This whole process introduces more intermediaries, not less. Which in turn creates more counterparty risk and cost, which then prices out the stablecoin as an economical competitor to fiat currency in most situations. It’s even worse if ETH is used as a proxy because then there are multiple hops.

This negative feedback loop is the reason that stablecoins have primarily been confined to the speculation fuelled crypto-economy where the “growth” has largely resulted from inflationary rewards or ponzi-esque structures. At present this is a zero/negative sum game and isn’t sustainable for a decentralized money, because there isn’t any real productive economic growth.

If you can’t pay for tangible goods and services with crypto better than the status quo, then you certainly aren’t going to take on debt risk in those assets to try and produce real economic growth by taking on entrepreneurial endeavours (ie. expanding a farm or a business). This is why much of the borrowing activity in DeFi has been for speculation or arbitrage and not sustainable economic growth activities, and why underpinning stablecoins with volatile speculative assets has posed such a problem for maintaining a confident price peg against fiat currencies that are (in theory) backed by real economic activity.

In reality, you’re also exposed to regulatory compliance worries regardless. You either internalize it at the core protocol or push it to the edges (ie. on/off ramps). But by pushing it to the edges you practically guarantee that it won’t reach large scale adoption because it’s not as economical and efficient as the status quo, because more intermediaries introduced. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t.

How could it work?

Today, USDT and USDC are the most used to pay for real goods and services (mainly on Tron). This is because in some markets they can compete with the status quo (largely in markets that lack USD liquidity/access). The reason it’s USDC and USDT instead of DAI, RAI, EURC, a CAD dollar or the Yuan is because:

  1. They are the most liquid and accessible, especially at on/off ramps and fast low-cost networks;
  2. Compared to other crypto-assets they are the most regulatory compliant which enables more trust and on/off ramps;
  3. They are familiar and piggy back off the insane demand for USD as the currency for global trade; and
  4. They have perceived low peg and redemption risk for the most trusted fiat currency (especially USDC)

For USDC in particular its rapid growth has been precisely because it is USD pegged and more regulatory compliant.

Now, this may change with regulations, and I’m not saying USDC and USDT on Tron are the pinnacle of what should be aimed for but it’s worth noting that both have seen rapid growth vs. other stablecoins because of their ability to compete with the current status quo, especially in markets that lack adequate USD access through traditional rails. This makes sense given that USD is the most trusted and demanded fiat currency for global commerce (for now).

All this to say that if we want DAI to become decentralized money then I think:

  1. Decentralized money needs a fast, low-cost, and sufficiently decentralized ledger so that there is 100% uptime;
  2. Decentralized money needs decentralized and uncorrelated demand; and
  3. Such demand needs to be sufficient such that you’re too big to fail and very unlikely to see a large enough liquidity collapse that would erode trust

There are concrete steps to ensure point 1 is addressed. Points 2 and 3 can only happen if you can pay for real goods and services with DAI in a way that is better than the status quo. And the only way to achieve that is if:

  1. Payments are low cost and finality is < 5s;
  2. It’s easy to access and use;
  3. The perceived value/purchasing power of DAI remains stable and trusted; and
  4. Holders of DAI are not likely to be tainted or restricted simply by holding it;

To me, continuing to be regulatory compliant, building up more real world asset reserves, weaning off of USDC (becoming a better alternative), and being available on fast low-cost networks is the path to achieving this.

As an aside, our company has been working in this direction and is on track for deploying a digital currency on a decentralized network that would be properly regulated and enable direct p2p, b2b, and government tax payments across an entire country in 2022/2023. It’s a unique opportunity to demonstrate the practical effectiveness of a pseudo-CBDC under proper regulatory supervision because this country does not have a central bank, has a USD pegged currency and has crypto-favourable leadership and regulators. This could be a viable path to having DAI being used to power an entire country, which could be a way to demonstrate to other nations that open source technologies are better at balancing financial crime and financial access.

Not trying to shill. Simply sharing some context. Happy to discuss more if there’s interest in going this direction. :slightly_smiling_face:

Final Thoughts

Given that today, USD is the most trusted and in demand currency, I fear that a deviation from a USD peg and lack of regulatory compliance will prevent DAI from being used as money in the real world because it will never be able to gain sufficiently large enough trust and demand.

Without adequate cost-effective bridges to the “real world” or the ability to pay for things with DAI, DAI as a decentralized money alternative will be destined to fail and will more closely resemble a closed loop crypto casino chip. My personal view is that it would be better to be regulatory compliant, gain sufficiently decentralized demand and usage for real world economic activity, and then look to cut ties from a USD peg. By de-pegging and free floating now, I think there is a much harder hill to climb towards decentralized usage because it kills any large scale real world demand.

I think fighting regulation is a losing battle. Nearly every country will eventually fall in line with OFAC and FATF guidelines so long as the US dollar is still the dominant global trade currency. On a macro scale we’re seeing a shift in geo politics and the recent discussion between China, Russia and Saudi Arabia to contemplate energy trading in alternative currencies to the USD could thrust in a bifurcation in global trade. Maybe this changes OFACs reach, but even still, that will likely take years to play out.

After speaking with banks and leaders in many countries (especially non-G20) many are very interested in the potential for stablecoins to alter the current correspondent banking relationships and reduce the friction and accessibility gaps that exist in our current global financial systems. The fact that most global transactions clear through the US fed is a huge reason the US still exerts financial control over the world. When you meet with them, you realize that politicians are still people. They value a lot of the same things - privacy, financial autonomy, freedom, helping people and preventing human harm. Many want to be able to make decisions over their country’s sovereignty and trade partnerships without the risk of losing their financial access just the same as individuals want to be able to do with their money as they please. This is not just a mentality reserved for cypherpunks.

Cryptocurrency can enable a shift in these power structures and the emerging currency war between the Yuan and the USD, could provide a unique opportunity for a stable, non-sovereign currency to emerge as a preferred alternative among trade parters (probably more akin to an SDR like structure).

But the only way that a cryptocurrency would even be considered is if it can be used as good money for payments in real world economies. If you look at history and how currencies gained dominance, they started by powering local real world economies where there were unique and demanded goods or services (generally highly demanded commodities like food, energy, metals, technology, etc). From there, the country with the most dominant production of those high demand goods or services would require others to adopt its currency for trade. After pricing core commodities, this typically trickled down over time to other secondary goods and services. This is how the USD became the global reserve.

This is what many Bitcoin maximalists hope for BTC. That it will be a global reserve currency. But its fixed supply curve prevents BTC from being used as currency in a meaningful way due to the inherent volatility resulting from an inelastic supply curve. It’s just too blunt an economic instrument. Something more elastic that is pegged to a collateral basket of real world assets/economic activity has a much better chance of success. Having DAI peg to a CPI or commodity index would be more along these lines and the RWA integration work that was being done here seemed to be an important stepping stone towards this.

While I was initially against the USDC inclusion years ago for the very real risks that have been described ad nauseam, I think the path towards RWA integration put DAI on a better track to becoming a decentralized money and cutting this effort short would be a mistake if that’s the goal.

So I think the most important question to answer first is… What does DAI want to be?

Should it be globally used money that is accessible and used by everyone?

or

Should it be what would likely become a niche cryptocurrency that a subset of people are willing to forgo convenience and/or cost savings because they find value in it’s censorship resistance?

Either way I’m 100% in agreement with @rune that I don’t think you can have both.

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I want to take a step back and question the approach and the stated objectives articulated here.

Two Competing Visions for Dai

There are two visions for Dai present in this thread:

  • The protocol intermediates illiquid generalized on-chain capital in return for a stable priced asset. The asset price is tightly coupled to the global reserve currency to support broader usage and facilitate efficient foreign exchange decisions. The cost of supporting a broad scope of collateral and a tight exchange peg is seen in the necessity for a large degree of protocol controlled liquid USD-denominated revenue (hence the exposure to regulatory risk). This version of Dai is a principle connection between on-chain capital markets and the global money market.

  • The protocol intermediates illiquid decentralized on-chain capital in return for a stable priced asset. The asset price floats compared to other assets and its liquidity flows are tightly coupled with the decentralized economy. The cost of supporting liquidity to the decentralized ecosystem is seen in the necessity for a high-degree of stabilizing capital controls. This version of Dai is the primary money market for primarily decentralized capital markets.

These are overly simplified and laden with assumptions, but I think it articulates the overall visions succinctly enough to engender conversation.

On the Approach

Today the protocol feels firmly in pursuit of the former vision and the Endgame is now expressing a desire to pivot towards the latter. The significant external touchpoints that have been developed (i.e. governance, oracles, centralized front-ends, off/on-ramps) directly pull against the ideals of the latter vision. Before we can even address the vision, the protocol needs to be able to overcome or mitigate the risk exposure from these areas. @brianmcmichael , as always, articulates well many of the system mechanisms that can be used here.

For mitigating the rest, such as decentralized oracles:

This is absolutely critical in being able to address the above concerns effectively. I can actually better understand the sense of urgency and all or nothing approach by the Endgame now. But this is a big vision that outsources effectively all the work to MetaDAOs and relies on the value accrued to MetaDAO tokens to serve as effective incentives. This means we are relying on the ability to execute across decentralized counterparties, on ambitious and complex topics, and relying on the incentives of the proposed tokenomics.

On the Vision

Beyond the approach to executing on this vision, there’s a significant question about the vision itself. I can understand the desire to strictly adhere to the domain of the decentralized capital markets, as it minimizes the exposure to the politics of the real-world. But what is the upside?

In simple terms: What is the potential for revenue-driven activity created solely by ETH, especially as it pertains to a stable-asset instrument? Without being able to facilitate payments in a larger economic context, Dai is limited to only the economic potential of the decentralized ecosystem - is this sufficient? If payment assets follow a power-law, why would Dai not lose ground to a more broadly usable instrument?

This seems to me like the obvious outstanding issue with the proposed plan.

Thankfully my Canadian brother @ekryski has articulated an alternative vision that captures my feelings on this subject well, so I co-sign his post as what I would like to see pursued as an alternative vision.

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Very well articulated. It seems you and I are on the same wavelength. You expanded on my long rant perfectly.

I don’t know the answers but these are precisely the questions I had in mind that I didn’t articulate quite as well above.

I don’t think the ship has sailed on proving utility and preventing over regulation. Could it be closing in the USA? Yes. But based on my experience there is still great demand for both of these, the biggest being a global payment currency that is not confined to the decentralized ecosystem.

My personal view is that what is most valuable and best for humanity overall (and therefore for DAI), is playing the long game, and ultimately creating one unified currency for the world that is not driven by a single nation state. This is a decade+ journey and right now requires navigating regulatory compliance and geo politics while adoption is still in its infancy in order to create a network effect of such size that can be decentralized and economically resilient. The whole of crypto is not there yet because the majority of the activity is speculative as opposed to utilitarian.

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